Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.
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Content and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind
The Argument is Self-Undermining 3. Accordingly, even if his judgment is self-verifying, it is tendentious to say he knows from the armchair the content of his thought.
It is rather directed at a view based solely on the Twin Earth thought experiments, given that the experiments are more naturally seen as apriori. Philosophical PapersNew York: The sentiment is often that SK should have been highly suspect from the start.
Volume 10Boston: A compatibilist might first grant that Oscar does not forget strictly speaking—after all, we can assume no neurological impairment has occurred in him. A judgment could de facto be perfectly reliable, yet the subject might still have some unanswered questions about it. If Oscar is aware that he has no such hypotheses i. Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content. For the externalist thought experiments allow a subject to possess e.
Predictably, such theories face various difficulties—so none provide a decisive case for EXT.
Paul Boghossian, Content and self-knowledge – PhilPapers
In this, p is known apriori or just: And in those cases, one could not rule out this possibility just from the armchair. Plausibly, we do not satisfy TC when it comes to self-verifying judgments see section 3. This parallels a natural view of perceptual judgment: For instance, suppose after the switch that Oscar judges: But what determines relevance exactly? But there is one key difference: But such a response is not available to W.
Indeed, it is typically assumed that a person acquires a concept from experience—which already portends that acquisition depends on empirical knowledge. But for replies, see Korman and Parent a,ch.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Request removal from index. Yet if it is unknown what thought is expressed by IIone can hardly be justified in accepting the thought.
This article has no associated abstract. That just means he has a false belief about the content of his first order thought. Granted, Sawyer allows that given EXT, such a non-empirical warrant can be transmitted to 3.
According to her, self-knowledge is unlike perceptual knowledge in that it is not normally the product of any kind of recognition though she need not deny the existence of introspection altogether.
That suggests that if Oscar has acquired the concept, 4 must boghossiah true. Yet it may remain unclear whether EXT is committed to 1.
So already there is a problem with armchair self-knowledge, absent any premises about memory. We have explored one argument against boghossiah joint truth of EXT and SK, namely, the reductio to armchair knowledge of the world.
For if a slow switch hypothesis is relevant, then even a relevant alternatives epistemology demands that we discriminate water thoughts from twin water ocntent. The latter are stronger in claiming that the former are apriori. Keith Hossack – – Oxford University Press. Be that as it may, Warfield and Sawyer are often interpreted as embracing the reductio qua anti-skeptical argument.
Contextualism in the first instance is a view about knowledge, yet it implies that whether an alternative is relevant is determined by the evidential standards in the context. In addition, it is sometimes argued that EXT and SK preclude the standard analysis of epistemic possibility. Rather, the environment also figures into it. Consequently, on either horn of the dilemma, SK is threatened Brueckner If S is warranted in believing p and warranted in believing that p entails qthen S is warranted in believing q or is able to be thus warranted.
So given that 2 presupposes 3a non-empirical warrant for 3 makes possible an apriori warrant for 2. And that seems odd. Externalism, Inclusion, and Knowledge of Content. Thus, even if it is known that you are currently thinking that eelf-knowledge is scrumptious, EXT may preclude armchair knowledge that you believe this.